Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roberts, Michael R.; Sufi, Amir
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01476.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1657-1695
• 关键词: Managerial discretion; corporate-finance; debt; INVESTMENT; FIRMS; decisions; VIOLATIONS; covenants; credit; equity

摘要

We show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy. Net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations, when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit. The effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower's alternative sources of finance are costly. In addition, despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors, borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation.