Electing Directors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Jie; Garner, Jacqueline L.; Walkling, Ralph A.
• 署名单位: Drexel University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 2389-2421
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PROXY CONTESTS; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; firm performance; ceo turnover; OWNERSHIP; boards; COSTS; reputation; PROPOSALS

摘要

Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes-even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower abnormal CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms.