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作者：Phelps, Edmund S.
作者单位：Columbia University
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作者：Gerking, Shelby; Morgan, William E.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; University of Wyoming
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作者：Cipollone, Piero; Rosolia, Alfonso
作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
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作者：Smets, Frank; Wouters, Rafael
作者单位：European Central Bank; Ghent University; European Central Bank; National Bank of Belgium
摘要：Using a Bayesian likelihood approach, we estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the US economy using seven macroeconomic time series. The model incorporates many types of real and nominal frictions and seven types of structural shocks. We show that this model is able to compete with Bayesian Vector Autoregression models in out-of-sample prediction. We investigate the relative empirical importance of the various frictions. Finally, using the estimated model, we address a nu...
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作者：Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus; Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F.; Sargent, Thomas J.; Watson, Mark W.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University; New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Princeton University; Princeton University
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Antras, Pol; Helpman, Elhanan
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a tractable framework for the analysis of the relationship between contractual incompleteness, technological complementarities, and technology adoption. In our model, a firm chooses its technology and investment levels in contractible activities by suppliers of intermediate inputs. Suppliers then choose investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating payoffs from an ex post bargaining game. We show that greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of less advance...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W.
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：We present a dynamic model of network formation where nodes find other nodes with whom to form links in two ways: some are found uniformly at random, while others are found by searching locally through the current structure of the network (e.g., meeting friends of friends). This combination of meeting processes results in a spectrum of features exhibited by large social networks, including the presence of more high- and low-degree nodes than when links are formed independently at random, havin...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; McAfee, R. Preston
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter's utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate's character. This structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters, since a policy platform affects voters...
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作者：Olivei, Giovanni; Tenreyro, Silvana
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：A vast empirical literature has documented delayed and persistent effects of monetary policy shocks on output. We show that this finding results from the aggregation of output impulse responses that differ sharply depending on the timing of the shock. When the monetary policy shock takes place in the first two quarters of the year, the response of output is quick, sizable, and dies out at a relatively fast pace. In contrast, output responds very little when the shock takes place in the third o...
