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作者：Healy, Paul J.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputation building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which coope...
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作者：Black, Dan A.; Galdo, Jose; Smith, Jeffrey A.
作者单位：McMaster University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Princeton University; Cornell University
摘要：This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense) and the distributive spending is district-specific transfers (e.g., pork-barrel spending). Investment in the public good creates a dynamic ...
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作者：Haruvy, Ernan; Lahav, Yaron; Noussair, Charles N.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Emory University; Tilburg University
摘要：We elicit traders' predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15-period-lived asset. We find that individuals' beliefs about prices are adaptive, and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated. Most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market, and, when experienced, they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur. When pr...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Simpson, John; Wickelgren, Abraham L.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Previous papers by Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991) and Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2000) argue that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiple buyers. We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages. We then show, however, that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are downstream comp...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; McAfee, R. Preston
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter's utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate's character. This structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters, since a policy platform affects voters...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando; Atkeson, Andrew; Kehoe, Patrick J.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
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作者：Ravn, Morten O.; Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie; Uribe, Martin
作者单位：European University Institute; Duke University
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作者：Chu, Leon Yang; Sappington, David E. A.
作者单位：University of Southern California; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
