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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Princeton University; Cornell University
摘要：This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy. Policy choices are made by a legislature that can raise revenues via an income tax and by borrowing. Revenues can be used to finance a public good, whose value is stochastic, and pork-barrel spending. Policymaking cycles between a business-as-usual regime in which legislators bargain over pork, and a responsible policymaking regime in which policies maximize the collective good. Transitions between regimes are brought about by sh...
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作者：Steinsson, Jon
作者单位：Columbia University
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作者：Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者：Dessi, Roberta
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Harvard University
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions...
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作者：Haile, Philip A.; Hortacsu, Ali; Kosenok, Grigory
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; New Economic School
摘要：The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) notion of Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) has recently attracted considerable attention, due in part to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects. However, even with strong a priori restrictions on unobservables, QRE imposes no falsifiable restrictions: it can rationalize any distribution of behavior in any normal form game. After demonstrating this, we discuss several approach...
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作者：Foster, Lucia; Haltiwanger, John; Syverson, Chad
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We investigate the nature of selection and productivity growth in industries where we observe producer-level quantities and prices separately. We show there are important differences between revenue and physical productivity. Because physical productivity is inversely correlated with price while revenue productivity is positively correlated with price, previous work linking (revenue-based) productivity to survival confounded the separate and opposing effects of technical efficiency and demand ...
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作者：Caballero, Ricardo J.; Farhi, Emmanuel; Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：The sustained rise in US current account deficits, the stubborn decline in long-run real rates, and the rise in US assets in global portfolios appear as anomalies from the perspective of conventional models. This paper rationalizes these facts as an equilibrium outcome when different regions of the world differ in their capacity to generate financial assets from real investments. Extensions of the basic model generate exchange rate and foreign direct investment excess returns broadly consisten...
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作者：Friedman, John N.; Holden, Richard T.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Standard intuitions for optimal gerrymandering involve concentrating one's extreme opponents in unwinnable districts (packing) and spreading one's supporters evenly over winnable districts (cracking). These intuitions come from models with either no uncertainty about voter preferences or only two voter types. In contrast, we characterize the solution to a problem in which a gerrymanderer observes a noisy signal of voter preferences from a continuous distribution and creates N districts of equa...
