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作者：Downs, Julie S.; Loewenstein, George; Wisdom, Jessica
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
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作者：Ham, John C.; Li, Xianghong; Shore-Sheppard, Lara D.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; York University - Canada; Williams College
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作者：Lerner, Josh
作者单位：Harvard University
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作者：Mitra, Sophie
作者单位：Fordham University
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作者：Voigtlander, Nico; Voth, Hans-Joachim
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Pompeu Fabra University
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作者：Levinson, Arik
作者单位：Georgetown University; National Bureau of Economic Research
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：University of Bonn
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作者：Mas, Alexandre; Moretti, Enrico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study peer effects in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team. Using high-frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain, we find strong evidence of positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. Worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see ...
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作者：Ogawa, Hikaru; Wildasin, David E.
作者单位：Nagoya University; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky
摘要：We analyze models with inter jurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, such as CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction's emissions depend upon the local stock of capital, which is inter-jurisdictionally mobile and subject to local taxation. In important cases, decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocation, even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through Coas...
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作者：Landeo, Claudia M.; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：University of Alberta; Northwestern University; Harvard University
摘要：This paper reports the results of all experiment on exclusive contracts. We replicate the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Our findings are as follows. First, when the buyers can communicate, discrimination raises the likelihood of exclusion. Second, when the incumbent seller is unable to discriminate and must make the same offers to the buyers, communication reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Communication also induces mo...
