Peers at Work

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mas, Alexandre; Moretti, Enrico
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.1.112
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 112-145
• 关键词: Incentives; PRODUCTIVITY; education; pressure; CHOICE

摘要

We study peer effects in the workplace. Specifically, we investigate whether, how, and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team. Using high-frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain, we find strong evidence of positive productivity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift. Worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him. Additionally, workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact. We conclude that social pressure can partially internalize free-riding externalities that are built into manY workplaces. (JEL J24, L81, M54)