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作者:Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno
作者单位:Goethe University Frankfurt; Hitotsubashi University; Maastricht University
摘要:Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it ...
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作者:Sialm, Clemens
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:The tax burden on equity securities has varied substantially over time and remains a source of continuing policy debate. This paper investigates whether investors were compensated for the tax burden of equity securities over the period between 1913 and 2006. Taxes on equity securities vary over time due to changes in dividend and capital gains tax rates and due to changes in corporate payout policies. Equity taxes also vary across firms due to persistent differences in propensities to pay divi...
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作者:Osili, Una Okonkwo; Xie, Jia
作者单位:Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
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作者:Makowsky, Michael D.; Stratmann, Thomas
作者单位:University System of Maryland; Towson University; George Mason University
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作者:MacCini, Sharon; Yang, Dean
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
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作者:Landier, Augustin; Sraer, David; Thesmar, David
作者单位:New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
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作者:Miller, Nathan H.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning game-theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20-year span. Statistical tests are consistent with the notion that len...
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作者:Breneman, David W.
作者单位:University of Virginia
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作者:Clark, Robert L.
作者单位:North Carolina State University
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作者:Raphael, Steven; Smolensky, Eugene
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley