Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Landeo, Claudia M.; Spier, Kathryn E.
• 署名单位: University of Alberta; Northwestern University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1850
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1850-1877
• 关键词: pre-play communication; backward induction; COORDINATION; EFFICIENCY; preferences; auctions; breach; buyers; entry; joint

摘要

This paper reports the results of all experiment on exclusive contracts. We replicate the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Our findings are as follows. First, when the buyers can communicate, discrimination raises the likelihood of exclusion. Second, when the incumbent seller is unable to discriminate and must make the same offers to the buyers, communication reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Communication also induces more generous offers when the seller cannot discriminate, and divide-and-conquer offers when the seller call discriminate. Third, when communication is allowed, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. (JEL C72, C91, D62, D86, K12, K21, L12, L42)