Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ogawa, Hikaru; Wildasin, David E.
• 署名单位: Nagoya University; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1206
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1206-1217
• 关键词: Tax competition; public-goods; provision; taxation; SYSTEM

摘要

We analyze models with inter jurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, such as CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction's emissions depend upon the local stock of capital, which is inter-jurisdictionally mobile and subject to local taxation. In important cases, decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocation, even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. In particular, even when the preferences and production technologies differ among the agents, the decentralized system can result in globally efficient allocation. (JEL D62, H23, H73, H87, Q58)