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作者：Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Gromb, Denis; Piacentino, Giorgia
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a theory of secured debt, unsecured debt, and debt with anti-dilution covenants. We assume that, as in practice, covenants convey the right to accelerate if violated, but the new secured debt retains its priority even if issued in violation of covenants. We find that such covenants are nonetheless useful: They provide state-contingent financing flexibility, balancing over- and underinvestment incentives. The optimal debt structure is multilayered, combining secured and unsecured deb...
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作者：Antill, Samuel; Clayton, Christopher
作者单位：Harvard University; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium. Collateral-constrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) distressed firms to avoid liquidation. Liquidations create negative fire-sale externalities. Liquidations also relieve bank balance-sheet congestion, enabling new firm loans that generate positive collateral externalities by lowering bank borrowing rates. Socially optimal interventions encourage liquidation when firms have high operat...
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作者：Nielsen, Kasper Meisner
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School
摘要：This study examines the income loss following forced CEO turnovers using income data from the official records at the Danish Tax Authority. We find that dismissed CEOs' personal income is 40% lower in the five years following forced turnovers. The decline is driven by labor market outcomes: labor and entrepreneurial incomes decline, while other sources of income increase. We find larger declines in income for executives with poor performance during their tenures, consistent with the executive ...
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作者：Chen, Hui; Chen, Zhiyao; Li, Jun
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; City University of Hong Kong; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We propose a measure of the valuation gap between debt and equity-debt-equity spread (DES)-based on the difference between actual and equity-implied credit spreads. DES predicts cross-sectional stock and bond returns in opposite directions. This predictability is unique compared to existing mispricing measures and cannot be explained by exposures to various risk factors. High-DES firms are more likely to issue equity and retire debt, and have more insider equity selling. These findings are con...
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作者：Levit, Doron; Malenko, Nadya; Maug, Ernst
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Boston College; University of Mannheim
摘要：We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders. Our theory reconciles conflicting empirical findings by showing that standard measures of the voting premium often misrepresent the true value of voting rights, increased conflicts between the blockho...
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作者：Hu, Allen; Ma, Song
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Persuasive communication functions through not only content but also delivery-facial expression, tone of voice, and diction. This paper examines the persuasiveness of delivery in startup pitches. Using machine learning algorithms to process full pitch videos, we quantify persuasion in visual, vocal, and verbal dimensions. We find that positive (i.e., passionate, warm) pitches increase funding probability. However, conditional on funding, startups with higher levels of pitch positivity underper...
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作者：Bhutta, Neil; Hizmo, Aurel; Ringo, Daniel
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We assess racial discrimination in mortgage approvals using confidential data on mortgage applications. Minority applicants tend to have lower credit scores and higher leverage, and are less likely to receive algorithmic approval from race-blind automated underwriting systems (AUS). Observable applicant-risk factors explain most of the racial disparities in lender denials. Further, exploiting the AUS data, we show there are risk factors we do not observe, and these factors at least partially e...
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作者：Back, Kerry; Carlin, Bruce I.; Kazempour, Seyed M.; Xie, Chloe L.
作者单位：Rice University; Rice University; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Discretionary announcement timing generates high conditional risk premia of stock returns and a pattern of negative drifts followed by positive jumps. Average announcement returns are much larger than unconditional risk premia. Capital Asset Pricing Model alphas turn negative when conditioning on nondisclosure because betas rise faster than risk premia prior to disclosures, but average announcement returns may appear to be too large relative to market risk when betas are estimated from past re...
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作者：Chong, Carsten H.; Todorov, Viktor
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We derive tight pricing kernel restrictions from options with same-day expiration (0DTEs). These restrictions concern the volatility of small and frequent asset price moves that the equity and options markets must agree on in a frictionless economy. Their violation leads to pseudo-arbitrage opportunities, characterized by nontrivial reward-to-risk ratios over arbitrarily short horizons and achieved by a combined position in 0DTEs and the underlying asset. Empirically, we find no evidence of fe...
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作者：Fang, Lily; Goldman, Jim; Roulet, Alexandra
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; McGill University
摘要：Using two decades of French administrative data, we find that post-leveraged buyout (LBO), target firms reduce within-firm pay gaps while increasing profitability relative to control firms. Employee turnover drives the pay-gap reduction. In target and control firms alike, turnovers reduce average pay more at the top of the wage distribution than at the bottom because separated employees are paid more-new joiners less-than similar employees, especially among skilled employees. LBOs amplify this...
