The Voting Premium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levit, Doron; Malenko, Nadya; Maug, Ernst
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Boston College; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082; 1540-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70037
• 发表日期: 2026-06
• 关键词: share-one vote; Ownership structure; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; corporate governance; relative prices; MARKET; RIGHTS; majority; equilibrium; INFORMATION

摘要

We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders. Our theory reconciles conflicting empirical findings by showing that standard measures of the voting premium often misrepresent the true value of voting rights, increased conflicts between the blockholder and small shareholders do not necessarily raise the voting premium, and the voting premium can even turn negative when small shareholders free-ride on the blockholder's trades.