Personal Costs of Executive Turnovers

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Nielsen, Kasper Meisner
• 署名单位: Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082; 1540-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70064
• 发表日期: 2026-08-08
• 关键词: CEO TURNOVER; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; firm performance; AGENCY COSTS; incentives; MARKET; pay; COMPENSATION; ability; succession

摘要

This study examines the income loss following forced CEO turnovers using income data from the official records at the Danish Tax Authority. We find that dismissed CEOs' personal income is 40% lower in the five years following forced turnovers. The decline is driven by labor market outcomes: labor and entrepreneurial incomes decline, while other sources of income increase. We find larger declines in income for executives with poor performance during their tenures, consistent with the executive labor market being the main channel for the lower income. Overall, the findings suggest that executives face significant personal costs from forced turnovers.