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作者：Barkai, Simcha; Panageas, Stavros
作者单位：Boston College; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Young firms' contribution to aggregate employment has been underwhelming. We show that a similar trend is not apparent, however, in their contribution to aggregate sales or stock market capitalization, implying that these firms have exhibited a high average-to-marginal revenue product of labor. We study the implications of a gradual shift in the average-to-marginal revenue product of labor within a model of dynamic firm heterogeneity. We show that this shift provides (i) a unified explanation ...
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作者：Falato, Antonio; Scharfstein, David
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using confidential supervisory risk ratings, we document that banks increase risk after going public compared to a control group of banks that filed to go public but withdrew their filings for plausibly exogenous reasons. The increase in risk improves short-term performance at the expense of long-term performance. We argue that the increase in risk stems from pressure to maximize short-term stock prices and earnings once the bank is publicly traded. After going public, banks owned by investors...
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作者：Medina, Paolina C.; Pagel, Michaela
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Using an experiment in which 3.1 million bank customers were encouraged to save, we explore the mechanisms behind coholding liquid savings and credit card debt. Theoretically, we show that the joint responses of spending, saving, and borrowing to the nudge differ across economic models of coholding. Using machine learning techniques, we find that the most responsive individuals reduce spending and increase savings by 4.9% (206 USD PPP per month) while their credit card debt remains unchanged. ...
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作者：Bryzgalova, Svetlana; Huang, Jiantao; Julliard, Christian
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Using information in returns, we identify the stochastic process of consumption. We find that aggregate consumption reacts over multiple quarters to innovations spanned by financial markets. This persistent component accounts for over a quarter of consumption variation. These shocks command a large and significant risk premium, driving a large share of stocks' and a small yet significant fraction of bonds' time-series variation. Nevertheless, we find no support for stochastic volatility of con...
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作者：Martin, Christopher; Puri, Manju; Ufier, Alexander
作者单位：Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using unique, daily, account-level data, we investigate deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an outflow of uninsured depositors following bad regulatory news. Both regular and temporary deposit insurance reduce outflows. We provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with deposit outflows, deposit inflows are first order. Uninsured deposit outflows were largely offset with new insured deposit inflows as the bank approached failure, with the bank increasing term d...
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作者：Griffin, Thomas P.; Nini, Greg; Smith, David C.
作者单位：Villanova University; Drexel University; University of Virginia
摘要：The annual proportion of U.S. public firms that reported a financial covenant violation fell roughly 70% between 1997 and 2019. To understand this trend, we develop an estimable model of covenant design that depends on the ability to differentiate between distressed and nondistressed borrowers and the relative costs associated with screening incorrectly. We find that the drop in violations is best explained by an increased willingness to forgo early detection of distressed borrowers in exchang...
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作者：Buffa, Andrea M.; Liu, Qing; White, Lucy
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; City University of Hong Kong; Boston University
摘要：Real-world contracts are typically private, observed only by their direct signatories, so agents working together are vulnerable to the principal opportunistically reducing other agents' incentives. The principal can mitigate this commitment problem by giving the most skilled agent a budget and delegating authority to write other agents' contracts. This endogenous hierarchy, never optimal with public contracts, raises effort, output, and compensation but allows rent extraction. The principal p...
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作者：De Jong, Abe; Kooijmans, Tim; Koudijs, Peter
作者单位：University of Groningen; National Taiwan University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Can banks' reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off-balance sheet securities, such as mortgage-backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West-Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High-reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the...
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作者：Nozawa, Yoshio; Tsoy, Anton
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We study a search and bargaining model of over-the-counter markets for nonstandardized assets of heterogeneous quality. Once matched, investors privately learn their values positively correlated with asset quality. Bargaining results in delay that is hump-shaped in quality and U-shaped in asset turnover. We document these patterns in commercial real estate and corporate bonds markets. Extreme qualities are little affected by changes in asset standardization, while intermediate qualities are mo...
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作者：Bolton, Patrick; Li, Ye; Wang, Neng; Yang, Jinqiang
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; University of London; London Business School; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要：We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks' inabi...
