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作者：Fang, Hanming; Gong, Qing
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; ShanghaiTech University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：Matsumoto (2020) pointed out data and coding errors in Fang and Gong (2017). We show that these errors have limited impacts: all qualitative findings remain after correcting them. Matsumoto also discussed potential service overcounting in the aggregated utilization data we used to illustrate our method, and then quantified the extent of overcounting with a sample of Medicare claims. We acknowledge the issue but discuss the noise and the bias in his quantification. Overall, our proposed method ...
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作者：Bergquist, Lauren Falcao; Dinerstein, Michael
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Chicago
摘要：African agricultural markets are characterized by low farmer revenues and high consumer food prices. Many have worried that this wedge is partially driven by imperfect competition among intermediaries. This paper provides experimental evidence from Kenya on intermediary market structure. Randomized cost shocks and demand subsidies are used to identify a structural model of market competition. Estimates reveal that traders act consistently with joint profit maximization and earn median markups ...
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作者：Matsumoto, Brett
摘要：Fang and Gong (2017) develop a procedure to detect potential over-billing of Medicare by physicians. In their empirical analysis, they use aggregated claims data that can overstate the number of services performed due to features of Medicare billing. In this comment, I show how auditors can use detailed claims-level data to better target improper overbilling.
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作者：Coey, Dominic; Larsen, Bradley J.; Platt, Brennan C.
作者单位：Facebook Inc; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Brigham Young University
摘要：We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase reveal consumers' reservation prices. W...
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作者：Decker, Ryan A.; Haltiwanger, John; Jarmin, Ron S.; Miranda, Javier
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The pace of job reallocation has declined in the United States in recent decades. We draw insight from canonical models of business dynamics in which reallocation can decline due to (i) lower dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks faced by businesses, or (ii) weaker marginal responsiveness of businesses to shocks. We show that shock dispersion has actually risen, while the responsiveness of business-level employment to productivity has weakened. Moreover, declining responsiveness can account for a...
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作者：Einav, Liran; Finkelstein, Amy; Oostrom, Tamar; Ostriker, Abigail; Williams, Heidi
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We analyze selection into screening in the context of recommendations that breast cancer screening start at age 40. Combining medical claims with a clinical oncology model, we document that compliers with the recommendation are less likely to have cancer than younger women who select into screening or women who never screen. We show this selection is quantitatively important: shifting the recommendation from age 40 to 45 results in three times as many deaths if compliers were randomly selected...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study anonymous repeated games where players may be commitment types who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a pairwise dominant action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium pay-offs for general games. Our bound implies th...
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作者：Gurkaynak, Refet S.; Kisacikoglu, Burcin; Wright, Jonathan H.
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Macroeconomic news announcements are elaborate and multi-dimensional. We consider a framework in which jumps in asset prices around announcements reflect both the response to observed surprises in headline numbers and to latent factors, reflecting other news in the release. Non-headline news, for which there are no expectations surveys, is unobservable to the econometrician but nonetheless elicits a market response. We estimate the model by the Kalman filter, which efficiently combines OLS and...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London
摘要：We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a clash of narratives. Drawing on the Bayesian Networks literature, we represent a narrative by a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. Narratives generate beliefs by interpreting long-run correlations between these variables. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximize a representative agent's an...
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作者：Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We study the complexity of rules by paying experimental subjects to implement a series of algorithms and then eliciting their willingness-to-pay to avoid implementing them again in the future. The design allows us to examine hypotheses from the theoretical automata literature about the characteristics of rules that generate complexity costs. We find substantial aversion to complexity and a number of regularities in the characteristics of rules that make them complex and costly for subjects. Ex...
