Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coey, Dominic; Larsen, Bradley J.; Platt, Brennan C.
• 署名单位: Facebook Inc; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Brigham Young University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190460
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3748-3785
• 关键词: structural model; auctions

摘要

We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase reveal consumers' reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory. We quantify dynamic search frictions arising from deadlines and show how, with deadline-constrained buyers, seemingly neutral platform fee increases can cause large market shifts.