A Model of Competing Narratives
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20191099
发表日期：
2020
页码：
3786-3816
关键词：
摘要：
We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a clash of narratives. Drawing on the Bayesian Networks literature, we represent a narrative by a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. Narratives generate beliefs by interpreting long-run correlations between these variables. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximize a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that people are drawn to hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain, and their contribution to political polarization.