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作者：Chen, Zhao; Liu, Zhikuo; Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez; Xu, Daniel Yi
作者单位：Fudan University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study a Chinese policy that awards substantial tax cuts to firms with R&D investment over a threshold or notch. -Quasi- experimental variation and administrative tax data show a significant increase in reported R&D that is partly driven by firms relabeling expenses as R&D. Structural estimates show relabeling accounts for 24.2 percent of reported R&D and that doubling R&D would increase productivity by 9 percent. Policy simulations show that firm selection and relabeling determine the -cost...
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作者：Gross, Tal; Kluender, Raymond; Liu, Feng; Notowidigdo, Matthew J.; Wang, Jialan
作者单位：Boston University; Harvard University; University of Chicago; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：A more generous consumer bankruptcy system provides greater insurance against financial risks but may also raise the cost of credit. We study this trade-off using the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), which increased the costs of filing for bankruptcy. We identify the effects of BAPCPA on borrowing costs using variation in the effects of the reform across credit scores. We find that a one-percentage-point reduction in bankruptcy filing risk decreased credit...
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作者：Field, Erica; Pande, Rohini; Rigol, Natalia; Schaner, Simone; Moore, Charity Troyer
作者单位：Duke University; Yale University; Harvard University; University of Southern California
摘要：Can increasing control over earnings incentivize a woman to work, and thereby influence norms around gender roles? We randomly varied whether rural Indian women received bank accounts, training in account use, and direct deposit of public sector wages into their own (versus husbands') accounts. Relative to the accounts only group, women who also received direct deposit and training worked more in public and private sector jobs. The private sector result suggests gender norms initially constrai...
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作者：Brune, Lasse; Chyn, Eric; Kerwin, Jason
作者单位：Northwestern University; Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study a simple savings scheme that allows workers to defer receipt of part of their wages for three months at zero interest. The scheme significantly increases savings during the deferral period, leading to higher postdisbursement spending on lumpy goods. Two years later, after two additional rounds of the savings scheme, we find that treated workers have made permanent improvements to their homes. The popularity of the scheme implies a lack of good alternative savings options. The results ...
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作者：Chen, Daniel; Duffie, Darrell
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We model a simple market setting in which fragmentation of trade of the same asset across multiple exchanges improves allocative efficiency. Fragmentation reduces the inhibiting effect of price-impact avoidance on order submission. Although fragmentation reduces market depth on each exchange, it also isolates cross-exchange price impacts, leading to more aggressive overall order submission and better rebalancing of unwanted positions across traders. Fragmentation also has implications for the ...
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作者：Leaver, Clare; Ozier, Owen; Serneels, Pieter; Zeitlin, Andrew
作者单位：University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Williams College; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of East Anglia; Georgetown University
摘要：This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay for performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay-for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the ...
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作者：Fetzer, Thiemo; Souza, Pedro C. L.; Vanden Eynde, Oliver; Wright, Austin L.
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Chicago
摘要：How do foreign powers disengage from a conflict? We study this issue by examining the recent, large-scale security transition from international troops to local forces in the ongoing civil conflict in Afghanistan. We construct a new dataset that combines information on this transition process with declassified conflict outcomes and previously unreleased quarterly survey data of residents' perceptions of local security. Our empirical design leverages the staggered -roll-out of the transition, a...
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作者：Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Heller, C-Philipp; Kuebler, Dorothea; Kurino, Morimitsu
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Technical University of Berlin; Keio University
摘要：Allocating appointment slots is presented as a new application for market design. Online booking systems are commonly used by public authorities to allocate appointments for visa interviews, driver's licenses, passport renewals, etc. We document that black markets for appointments have developed in many parts of the world. Scalpers book the appointments that are offered for free and sell the slots to appointment seekers. We model the existing first-come-first-served booking system and propose ...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Mihm, Maximilian; Siga, Lucas; Tergiman, Chloe
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study two-player games where one-sided asymmetric information can lead to either adverse or advantageous selection. We contrast behavior in these games with settings where both players are uninformed. We find stark differences, suggesting that subjects do account for endogenous selection effects. Removing strategic uncertainty increases the fraction of subjects who account for selection. Subjects respond more to adverse than advantageous selection. Using additional treatments where we vary ...
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作者：Zou, Eric Yongchen
作者单位：University of Oregon; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Intermittent monitoring of environmental standards may induce strategic changes in polluting activities. This paper documents local strategic responses to a cyclical, once-every-six-day air quality monitoring schedule under the federal Clean Air Act. Using satellite data of monitored areas, I show that air quality is significantly worse on unmonitored days. This effect is explained by short-term suppression of pollution on monitored days, especially during high-pollution periods when the city'...
