Pay Me Later: Savings Constraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brune, Lasse; Chyn, Eric; Kerwin, Jason
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191657
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2179-2212
• 关键词: field experiment; self-control; incentives; POOR; ECONOMICS; banking; product; POWER

摘要

We study a simple savings scheme that allows workers to defer receipt of part of their wages for three months at zero interest. The scheme significantly increases savings during the deferral period, leading to higher postdisbursement spending on lumpy goods. Two years later, after two additional rounds of the savings scheme, we find that treated workers have made permanent improvements to their homes. The popularity of the scheme implies a lack of good alternative savings options. The results of a follow-up experiment suggest that demand for the scheme is partly due to its ability to address self-control issues.