Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leaver, Clare; Ozier, Owen; Serneels, Pieter; Zeitlin, Andrew
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Williams College; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of East Anglia; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191972
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2213-2246
• 关键词: financial incentives; EFFECTIVE TEACHERS; pay; motivation; outcomes; KNOWLEDGE; impacts; DESIGN; POLICY; call

摘要

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay for performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay-for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.