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作者：Ager, Philipp; Boustan, Leah; Eriksson, Katherine
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：The nullification of slave wealth after the US Civil War (1861-1865) was one of the largest episodes of wealth compression in history. We document that White Southern households that owned more slaves in 1860 lost substantially more wealth by 1870, relative to Southern households that had been equally wealthy before the war. Yet, their sons almost entirely recovered from this wealth shock by 1900, and their grandsons completely converged by 1940. Marriage networks and connections to other elit...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Miralles, Antonio; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Messina; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents...
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作者：Bourreau, Marc; Sun, Yutec; Verboven, Frank
作者单位：IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information (ENSAI); KU Leuven; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study a major new entry in the French mobile telecommunications market, followed by the introduction of fighting brands by the three incumbents. Using an empirical oligopoly model, we find that the incumbents' fighting brand strategies are difficult to rationalize as unilateral best responses. Instead, their strategies are consistent with a breakdown of tacit semi-collusion: before entry, the incumbents could successfully coordinate on restricting product variety to avoid cannibalization; a...
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作者：Mogstad, Magne; Torgovitsky, Alexander; Walters, Christopher R.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Statistics Norway; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Empirical researchers often combine multiple instrumental variables (IVs) for a single treatment using two-stage least squares (2SLS). When treatment effects are heterogeneous, a common justification for including multiple IVs is that the 2SLS estimand can be given a causal interpretation as a positively weighted average of local average treatment effects (LATEs). This justification requires the well-known monotonicity condition. However, we show that with more than one instrument, this condit...
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作者：Kostol, Andreas R.; Myhre, Andreas S.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Statistics Norway; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Despite the implications for policy, empirical evidence on the relative importance of factors that shape labor supply responses is missing. This paper helps fill this gap and quantifies the role of information frictions versus other frictions by combining notches in the Norwegian welfare system and quasi-experimental variation in access to information about the slope and location of kinks. While we estimate a frictionless elasticity of 0.3, overall frictions attenuate this elasticity by about ...
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作者：Biais, Bruno; Hombert, Johan; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Incentive problems make securities' payoffs imperfectly pledge able , limiting agents' ability to issue liabilities. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of such endogenous incompleteness in a dynamic exchange economy. Because markets are endogenously incomplete , agents have different intertemporal marginal rates of substitution , so that they value assets differently. Consequently , agents hold different portfolios. This leads to endogenous markets segmentation , which we characterize wit...
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作者：Almunia, Miguel; Antras, Pol; Lopez-Rodriguez, David; Morales, Eduardo
作者单位：CUNEF Universidad; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Banco de Espana; Princeton University
摘要：We study the relationship between domestic-demand shocks and exports using data for Spanish manufacturing firms in 2002-2013. Exploiting plausibly exogenous geographical variation caused by the Great Recession, we find that firms whose domestic sales declined by more experienced a larger increase in export flows, controlling for firms' supply determinants. This result illustrates the capacity of export markets to counteract the negative impact of local demand shocks. By structurally estimating...
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作者：Banerjee, Abhijit; Breza, Emily; Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Mobius, Markus
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Stanford University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Microsoft
摘要：The DeGroot model has emerged as a credible alternative to the standard Bayesian model for studying learning on networks, offering a natural way to model naive learning in a complex setting. One unattractive aspect of this model is the assumption that the process starts with every node in the network having a signal. We study a natural extension of the DeGroot model that can deal with sparse initial signals. We show that an agent's social influence in this generalized DeGroot model is essentia...
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作者：Madarasz, Kristof
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper studies bargaining with noncommon priors where the buyer projects and exaggerates the probability that her private information may leak to the seller. Letting the buyer name her price first, raises the seller's payoff above his payoff from posting a price. In seller-offer bargaining, projection implies a partial reversal of classic Coasian comparative static results. Weakening price commitment can benefit the seller and, as long as the relative speed at which imaginary information v...
