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作者：Martinez-Bravo, Monica; Padro i Miquel, Gerard; Qian, Nancy; Yao, Yang
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University
摘要：We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens' informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We co...
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作者：Brodeur, Abel; Cook, Nikolai; Heyes, Anthony
作者单位：University of Ottawa; Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Ottawa
摘要：In Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) we present evidence that instrumental variable (and to a lesser extent difference-in -difference) articles are more p-hacked than randomized controlled trial and regression discontinuity design articles. We also find no evidence that (i) articles published in the top five journals are different; (ii) the revise and resubmit process mitigates the problem; (iii) things are improving through time. Kranz and Putz (2022) apply a novel adjustment to address roundi...
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作者：Danz, David; Vesterlund, Lise; Wilson, Alistair J.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Subjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：Yale University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We formulate a model of social interactions and misinferences by agents who neglect assortativity in their society, mistakenly believing that they interact with a representative sample of the population. A key component of our approach is the interplay between this bias and agents' strategic incentives. We highlight a mechanism through which assortativity neglect, combined with strategic complementarities in agents' behavior, drives up action dispersion in society (e.g., socioeconomic disparit...
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作者：Arnold, David; Dobbie, Will; Hull, Peter
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Brown University
摘要：We develop new quasi-experimental tools to measure disparate impact, regardless of its source, in the context of bail decisions. We show that omitted variables bias in pretrial release rate comparisons can be purged by using the quasi-random assignment of judges to estimate average pretrial misconduct risk by race. We find that two-thirds of the release rate disparity between White and Black defendants in New York City is due to the disparate impact of release decisions. We then develop a hier...
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作者：Denti, Tommaso; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：Cornell University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We relate two main representations of the cost of acquiring information: a cost that depends on the experiment performed, as in statistical decision theory, and a cost that depends on the distribution of posterior beliefs, as in applications of rational inattention. We show that in many cases of interest, posterior-based costs are inconsistent with a primitive model of costly experimentation. The inconsistency is at the core of known limits to the application of rational inattention in games a...
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作者：Voss, Paul; Kulms, Marius
摘要：This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is neces-sary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The anal-ysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilit...
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作者：Boissel, Charles; Matray, Adrien
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This paper investigates the 2013 threefold increase in the French div-idend tax rate. Using administrative data covering the universe of firms from 2008 to 2017 and a quasi-experimental setting, we find that firms swiftly cut dividend payments and used this tax-induced increase in liquidity to invest more. Heterogeneity analyses show that firms with high demand and returns on capital responded most while no group of firms cut their investment. Our results reject models in which higher dividend...
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作者：Gelman, Michael; Kariv, Shachar; Shapiro, Matthew D.; Silverman, Dan
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Low liquidity and a high marginal propensity to consume are tightly linked. This paper analyzes this link in the context of income tax withholding and refunds. A theory of rational cash management with income uncertainty endogenizes the relationship between illiquidity and the marginal propensity to consume, and can explain the finding that households tend to spend tax refunds as if they valued liquidity, yet do not act to increase liquidity by reducing their withholding. The theory is support...
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作者：Kranz, Sebastian; PUtz, Peter
作者单位：Ulm University; University of Bielefeld
摘要：Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) study hypothesis tests from eco-nomic articles and find evidence for p-hacking and publication bias, in particular for instrumental variable and difference-in-difference studies. When adjusting for rounding errors (introducing a novel method), statistical evidence for p-hacking from randomization tests and caliper tests at the 5 percent significance threshold vanishes for difference-in-differnce studies but remains for instrumental variable studies. Results at t...
