Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Ishii, Yuhta
• 署名单位: Yale University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190486
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 3063-3105
• 关键词: rationalizable conjectural equilibrium; income-distribution; segregation; INFORMATION; education; games; expectations; INVESTMENT; FRAMEWORK; selection

摘要

We formulate a model of social interactions and misinferences by agents who neglect assortativity in their society, mistakenly believing that they interact with a representative sample of the population. A key component of our approach is the interplay between this bias and agents' strategic incentives. We highlight a mechanism through which assortativity neglect, combined with strategic complementarities in agents' behavior, drives up action dispersion in society (e.g., socioeconomic disparities in education investment). We also suggest that the combination of assortativity neglect and strategic incentives may be relevant in understanding empirically documented misperceptions of income inequality and political attitude polarization.