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作者：Ramos-Toro, Diego
作者单位：Dartmouth College
摘要：This paper explores the intergenerational consequences of social exclusion on prosociality. A lab-in-the-field approach in the histor-ical region of Colombia's leper colony reveals that descendants of socially excluded individuals are locally altruistic and extend such altruism to outsiders who have undergone similar circumstances. These individuals also display mistrust toward those who have , his-torically , been exclusionary-in this case , doctors. The content of historical narratives share...
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作者：Barwick, Panle Jia; Liu, Yanyan; Patacchini, Eleonora; Wu, Qi
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); Cornell University; Cornell University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Peking University
摘要：This paper uses the universe of cellphone records from a Chinese telecommunication provider for a northern Chinese city to examine the role of information exchange in urban labor markets. We provide the first direct evidence of increased communication among referral pairs around job changes. Information provided by social contacts mitigates information asymmetry and improves labor market perfor-mance. (JEL D82, J62, O18, P23, P25, R23, Z13)
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作者：Bernanke, Ben S.
作者单位：Brookings Institution
摘要：Credit markets, including the market for bank loans, are character-ized by imperfect and asymmetric information. These informational frictions can interact with other economic forces to produce periods of credit-market stress, in which intermediation is unusually costly and households and businesses have difficulty obtaining credit. A high level of credit-market stress, as in a severe financial crisis, may in turn produce a deep and prolonged recession. I present evidence that financial distre...
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作者：Schmieder, Johannes F.; von Wachter, Till; Heining, Joerg
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We document the sources behind the costs of job loss over the busi-ness cycle using administrative data from Germany. Losses in annual earnings after displacement are large, persistent, and highly cycli-cal, nearly doubling in size during downturns. A large part of the long-term earnings losses and their cyclicality is driven by declines in wages. Key to these long-lasting wage declines and their cyclical-ity are changes in employer characteristics, as displaced workers switch to lower-paying ...
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作者：Lane, Tom; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sonderegger, Silvia
作者单位：University of Nottingham Ningbo China; Aarhus University; University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham
摘要：A large theoretical literature argues laws exert a causal effect on norms, but empirical evidence remains scant. Using a novel identification strategy, we provide a compelling empirical test of this proposition. We use incentivized vignette experiments to directly measure social norms relating to actions subject to legal thresholds. Our large-scale experiments (n = 7,000) run in the United Kingdom, United States, and China show that laws can causally influence social norms. Results are robust ...
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作者：Pomatto, Luciano; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
摘要：We develop an axiomatic theory of information acquisition that cap-tures the idea of constant marginal costs in information production: the cost of generating two independent signals is the sum of their costs, and generating a signal with probability half costs half its original cost. Together with Blackwell monotonicity and a continuity condition, these axioms determine the cost of a signal up to a vector of param-eters. These parameters have a clear economic interpretation and determine the ...
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作者：Brzustowski, Thomas; Georgiadis-harris, Alkis; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer's valua-tion is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether to deploy the previous period's contract or to replace it with a new one. The main result of the paper is that the Coase conjecture fails: the monopo-list's payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor. (JEL D42,...
