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作者：Giglio, Stefano; Maggiori, Matteo; Stroebel, Johannes
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; New York University
摘要：In Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel (2016), we propose and implement a new test for classic rational bubbles. Such bubbles derive their value from each agent's rational expectation of being able to resell the bubble claims to the next agent. Backward induction ensures that classic rational bubbles can only exist on infinite-maturity assets. Our empirical exercise shows that infinite-maturity claims and 999-year claims for otherwise identical housing assets trade at the same price, and thus rules...
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作者：Salant, Yuval; Cherry, Josh
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider statistical inference in games. Each player obtains a small random sample of other players' actions, uses statistical inference to estimate their actions, and chooses an optimal action based on the estimate. In a sampling equilibrium with statistical inference (SESI), the sample is drawn from the distribution of players' actions based on this process. We characterize the set of SESIs in large two-action games, and compare their predictions to those of Nash equilibrium, and for diff...
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作者：Hartmann, Lorenz
作者单位：University of Freiburg
摘要：Savage (1954) provided the first axiomatic characterization of expected utility without relying on any given probabilities or utilities. It is the most famous preference axiomatization existing. This note shows that Savage's axiom P3 is implied by the other axioms, which reveals its redundancy. It is remarkable that this was not noticed before as Savage's axiomatization has been studied and taught by hundreds of researchers for more than six decades.
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作者：Dubois, Pierre; Saethre, Morten
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Differences in regulated pharmaceutical prices within the European Economic Area create arbitrage opportunities that pharmacy retailers can access through parallel imports. For prescription drugs under patent, parallel trade affects the sharing of profits among an innovating pharmaceutical company, retailers, and parallel traders. We develop a structural model of demand and supply in which retailers can choose the set of goods to sell, thus foreclosing consumers' access to less profitable drug...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kandori, Michihiro
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper proposes a class of games calledrevision games. In a revision game, players start with initially prepared actions, followed by a sequence of random revision opportunities until a predetermined deadline. In the course of revisions, players monitor each other's behavior. It is shown that players can cooperate and that their behavior under the optimal equilibrium is described by a simple differential equation. We present the necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation to be sus...
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作者：Sentana, Enrique
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作者：Brooks, Wyatt; Donovan, Kevin
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Yale University
摘要：We measure the impact of increasing integration between rural villages and outside labor markets. Seasonal flash floods cause exogenous and unpredictable loss of market access. We study the impact of new bridges that eliminate this risk. Identification exploits variation in riverbank characteristics that preclude bridge construction in some villages, despite similar need. We collect detailed annual household surveys over three years, and weekly telephone followups to study contemporaneous effe...
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作者：Burstein, Ariel; Hanson, Gordon; Tian Lin; Vogel, Jonathan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Harvard University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：In this paper, we study how occupation (or industry) tradability shapes local labor-market adjustment to immigration. Theoretically, we derive a simple condition under which the arrival of foreign-born labor into a region crowds native-born workers out of (or into) immigrant-intensive jobs, thus lowering (or raising) relative wages in these occupations, and we explain why this process differs within tradable versus within nontradable activities. Using data for U.S. commuting zones over the per...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non-uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record-keeping or communication devices-including cheap talk communication and public randomization-are necessary.
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作者：Trevino, Isabel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion. One is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies, and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets. Using global games, I present a two-country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and I test its predictions experimentally. The expe...
