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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：Yale University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We exhibit a natural environment, social learning among heterogeneous agents, where even slight misperceptions can have a large negative impact on long-run learning outcomes. We consider a population of agents who obtain information about the state of the world both from initial private signals and by observing a random sample of other agents' actions over time, where agents' actions depend not only on their beliefs about the state but also on their idiosyncratic types (e.g., tastes or risk at...
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作者：Sheng, Shuyang
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：The objective of this paper is to identify and estimate network formation models using observed data on network structure. We characterize network formation as a simultaneous-move game, where the utility from forming a link depends on the structure of the network, thereby generating strategic interactions between links. With the prevalence of multiple equilibria, the parameters are not necessarily point identified. We leave the equilibrium selection unrestricted and propose a partial identific...
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作者：Abadie, Alberto; Athey, Susan; Imbens, Guido W.; Wooldridge, Jeffrey M.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Stanford University; Michigan State University
摘要：Consider a researcher estimating the parameters of a regression function based on data for all 50 states in the United States or on data for all visits to a website. What is the interpretation of the estimated parameters and the standard errors? In practice, researchers typically assume that the sample is randomly drawn from a large population of interest and report standard errors that are designed to capture sampling variation. This is common even in applications where it is difficult to art...
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作者：Georgiadis, George; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper considers a Principal-Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information-acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for t...
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作者：Currie, Janet M.; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：Treatment for depression is complex, requiring decisions that may involve trade-offs between exploiting treatments with the highest expected value and experimenting with treatments with higher possible payoffs. Using patient claims data, we show that among skilled doctors, using a broader portfolio of drugs predicts better patient outcomes, except in cases where doctors' decisions violate loose professional guidelines. We introduce a behavioral model of decision making guided by our empirical ...
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作者：Attanasio, Orazio; Pastorino, Elena
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Stanford University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This paper examines the prices of basic staples in rural Mexico. We document that nonlinear pricing in the form of quantity discounts is common, that quantity discounts are sizable for basic staples, and that the well-known conditional cash transfer program Progresa has significantly increased quantity discounts, although the program, as documented in previous studies, has not affected unit prices on average. To account for these patterns, we propose a model of price discrimination that nests ...
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作者：Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Larreguy, Horacio; Xandri, Juan Pablo
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要：We theoretically and empirically study an incomplete information model of social learning. Agents initially guess the binary state of the world after observing a private signal. In subsequent rounds, agents observe their network neighbors' previous guesses before guessing again. Agents are drawn from a mixture of learning types-Bayesian, who face incomplete information about others' types, and DeGroot, who average their neighbors' previous period guesses and follow the majority. We study (1) l...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Mirrokni, Vahab; Paes Leme, Renato; Tang, Pingzhong; Zuo, Song
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Tsinghua University
摘要：We introduce a new family of dynamic mechanisms that restricts sellers from using future distributional knowledge. Since the allocation and pricing of each auction period do not depend on the type distributions of future periods, we call this family of dynamic mechanisms non-clairvoyant. We develop a framework (bank account mechanisms) for characterizing, designing, and proving lower bounds for dynamic mechanisms (clairvoyant or non-clairvoyant). We use the same methods to compare the revenue ...
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作者：Faingold, Eduardo
作者单位：Insper
摘要：Equilibrium payoff bounds from reputation effects are derived for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which a long-run player interacts frequently with a population of short-run players and the monitoring technology scales with the length of the period of interaction. The bounds depend on the monitoring technology through theflow of information, a measure of signal informativeness per unit of time based on relative entropy. Examples are shown where, under complete information, t...
