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作者：Imbens, Guido; Donaldson, Dave; Jones, Charles I.; Lipman, Bart L.; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Muller, Ulrich K.; Nevo, Aviv; Wolinsky, Asher
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作者：Besley, Timothy
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
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作者：Taber, Christopher; Vejlin, Rune
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Aarhus University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：In this paper, we develop a model that captures key components of the Roy model, a search model, compensating differentials, and human capital accumulation on-the-job. We establish which components of the model can be non-parametrically identified and which ones cannot. We estimate the model and use it to assess the relative contribution of the different factors for overall wage inequality. We find that variation in premarket skills (the key feature of the Roy model) is the most important comp...
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作者：Myerson, Roger B.; Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：We extend Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibrium to games with infinite sets of signals and actions. A strategy profile is a conditional epsilon-equilibrium if, for any of a player's positive probability signal events, his conditional expected utility is within epsilon of the best that he can achieve by deviating. With topologies on action sets, a conditional epsilon-equilibrium is full if strategies give every open set of actions positive probability. Such full conditional epsil...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：University of Tokyo; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper studies the robustness of an equilibrium to incomplete information in binary-action supermodular games. Using a generalized version of belief operator, we explore the restrictions that prior beliefs impose on higher order beliefs. In particular, we obtain a nontrivial lower bound on the probability of a common belief event, uniform over type spaces, when the underlying game has a monotone potential. Conversely, when the game has no monotone potential, we construct a type space with ...
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作者：Antic, Nemanja; Persico, Nicola
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In a cheap-talk setting where the conflict of interest between sender and receiver is determined endogenously by the choice of parameters theta(i) for each agent i, conditions are provided that determine the sign of each agent's inverse demand for theta without assuming that the most informative equilibrium will necessarily be played in the cheap talk game. For two popular functional forms of payoffs, we derive analytically tractable approximations for agent i's demand for theta. In an applica...
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作者：Enikolopov, Ruben; Makarin, Alexey; Petrova, Maria
作者单位：New Economic School; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Do new communication technologies, such as social media, alleviate the collective action problem? This paper provides evidence that penetration of VK, the dominant Russian online social network, led to more protest activity during a wave of protests in Russia in 2011. As a source of exogenous variation in network penetration, we use the information on the city of origin of the students who studied with the founder of VK, controlling for the city of origin of the students who studied at the sam...
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作者：Babus, Ana; Kondor, Peter; Wang, Yilin
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
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作者：Moscona, Jacob; Nunn, Nathan; Robinson, James A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; University of Chicago
摘要：We test the longstanding hypothesis that ethnic groups organized around segmentary lineages are more prone to conflict. Ethnographic accounts suggest that in such societies, which are characterized by strong allegiances to distant relatives, individuals are obligated to come to the aid of fellow lineage members when they become involved in conflicts. As a consequence, small disagreements often escalate into larger-scale conflicts involving many individuals. We test for a link between segmentar...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Brooks, Benjamin; Sannikov, Yuliy
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago; Stanford University
摘要：We study the pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of stochastic games with perfect monitoring, geometric discounting, and public randomization. We develop novel algorithms for computing equilibrium payoffs, in which we combine policy iteration when incentive constraints are slack with value iteration when incentive constraints bind. We also provide software implementations of our algorithms. Preliminary simulations indicate that they are significantly more efficient than existing meth...
