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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
摘要：This paper investigates the effect of voters' short-term memory on political outcomes by considering politics as a collective learning process. We find that short-term memory may lead to cycles of polarization and consensus across parties' platforms. Following periods of party consensus, short-term memory implies that there is little variation in voters' data and therefore limited information about the true state of the world. This in turn allows parties to further their own interests and henc...
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作者：Aneja, Abhay; Luca, Michael; Reshef, Oren
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Johns Hopkins University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Is there latent demand to support Black-owned businesses? We explore this question by analyzing a new feature that made it easier to identify Black-owned restaurants on an online platform. We find that labeling restaurants as minority-owned increased customer engagement and firm performance, as measured by online traffic, calls, orders, and in-person visits. These effects were more pronounced in areas characterized by greater support for the Democratic Party and lower implicit bias against rac...
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作者：Alan, Sule; Kubilay, Elif
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; University of Essex
摘要：We test the effectiveness of a behavioral program grounded in the idea that status granting and self-persuasion might yield a robust behavioral change in disadvantaged adolescents. We enlist socially connected senior middle school students with high emotional intelligence as student-teachers and entrust them with delivering a curriculum to their junior peers. The program empowers student-teachers, leading them to improve their social environment. It reduces disciplinary incidents and antisoci...
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作者：Clayton, Christopher; Schaab, Andreas
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Should central banks' inflation targets remain set in stone? We study a dynamic mechanism design problem between a government and a central bank. The central bank has persistent private information about structural shocks. Firms learn the state from the central bank's reports and form inflation expectations. A dynamic inflation target implements the full-information commitment allocation. The central bank is delegated the authority to adjust the target's level and flexibility one period in adv...
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作者：Jha, Akshaya; Leslie, Gordon
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Monash University
摘要：Firms expect to recover the fixed costs required to start production by earning positive operating profits in subsequent periods. We develop a dynamic competitive benchmark that accounts for start-up costs, showing that static markups overstate the rents attributable to market power in an electricity market where generators frequently stop and start production in response to rooftop solar output. We demonstrate that the large-scale expansion of solar capacity can lead to increases in the colle...
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作者：Buchmann, Nina; Dupas, Pascaline; Ziparo, Roberta
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We study reputation dynamics within the household in a setting where women regularly receive transfers from their husbands for household purchases. We propose a signaling model in which wives try to maintain a good reputation in the eyes of their husbands to receive high transfers. This leads them to (i) avoid risky purchases (goods with unknown returns) and (ii) knowingly overuse low-return goods to hide bad purchase decisions-we call this the intrahousehold sunk cost effect. We present suppo...
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作者：Chen, Qiaoyi; Chen, Zhao; Liu, Zhikuo; Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez; Xu, Daniel Yi
作者单位：Fudan University
摘要：We study a prominent energy regulation affecting large Chinese manufacturers that are part of broader conglomerates. Using detailed firm-level data and difference-in-differences research designs, we show that regulated firms cut output and shifted some production to unregulated firms within their conglomerate instead of improving their energy efficiency. To account for conglomerate and market spillovers, we interpret these results through the lens of an industry equilibrium model featuring con...
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作者：Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Duke University; Northwestern University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator's worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator's complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator's payoff is consumers' surplus, he caps the firm's average revenue. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a piece rate subsidy to the firm while capping the total subsidy...
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作者：Davis, Steven J.; Krolikowski, Pawel M.
作者单位：Stanford University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：We design and field an innovative survey of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients that yields new insights about wage stickiness on the layoff margin. A majority of UI recipients would accept pay cuts of 5-10 percent to save their jobs, and one-third would accept a 25 percent cut. Yet worker-employer discussions about cuts in pay, benefits, or hours in lieu of layoffs are exceedingly rare. Roughly one-quarter of the layoffs in our sample violate the theoretical condition for bilaterally effic...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Applicants to schools, colleges, and jobs hedge by applying to a broad range of options, including reaches, matches, and safeties. We develop a simultaneous-search framework that rationalizes this practice. In this framework, the admissions process is correlated across schools so that if an applicant is rejected by one school, she is more likely to be rejected by more selective schools. We find that an applicant then optimally targets both safeties and reaches. We characterize how the optimal ...
