Robust Monopoly Regulation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran
署名单位：
Duke University; Northwestern University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20191950
发表日期：
2025
页码：
599-634
关键词：
摘要：
We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator's worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator's complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator's payoff is consumers' surplus, he caps the firm's average revenue. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a piece rate subsidy to the firm while capping the total subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator combines these three policy instruments to balance three goals: protecting consumers'surplus, mitigating underproduction, and limiting potential overproduction.