Sticky Wages on the Layoff Margin

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Davis, Steven J.; Krolikowski, Pawel M.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240309
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 491-524
• 关键词: UNITED-STATES; CONTRACTS; inflation; RIGIDITY; quits

摘要

We design and field an innovative survey of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients that yields new insights about wage stickiness on the layoff margin. A majority of UI recipients would accept pay cuts of 5-10 percent to save their jobs, and one-third would accept a 25 percent cut. Yet worker-employer discussions about cuts in pay, benefits, or hours in lieu of layoffs are exceedingly rare. Roughly one-quarter of the layoffs in our sample violate the theoretical condition for bilaterally efficient separations. We draw on our findings and other evidence to assess theories of wage stickiness and its role in layoffs.