A Theory of Dynamic Inflation Targets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clayton, Christopher; Schaab, Andreas
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230496
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 448-490
• 关键词: fiscal rules; staggered prices; monetary-policy; Central banks; DISCRETION; models

摘要

Should central banks' inflation targets remain set in stone? We study a dynamic mechanism design problem between a government and a central bank. The central bank has persistent private information about structural shocks. Firms learn the state from the central bank's reports and form inflation expectations. A dynamic inflation target implements the full-information commitment allocation. The central bank is delegated the authority to adjust the target's level and flexibility one period in advance. A declining natural interest rate and a flattening Phillips curve imply opposite optimal target adjustments. Our results speak to practical policy questions of inflation target design.