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作者：McDevitt, Ryan C.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper considers when a firm's deliberately chosen name can signal meaningful information. The average plumbing firm whose name begins with A or a number receives five times more service complaints than other firms and also charges higher prices. Relatedly, plumbers with A names advertise more in the Yellow Pages and on Google, and doing so is positively correlated with receiving complaints. As the use of A names is more prevalent in larger markets, I reconcile these findings with a simple...
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作者：Mitra, Anirban; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：University of Oslo; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are low, increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it. We then apply the model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures has a negative or no effect. These findings spe...
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作者：Kessler, Anke S.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：The paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy-relevant information. Depending on the type of policy under consideration, communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible. This generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending, universalism, and uniformity. Building on th...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan; Rousseau, Peter L.
作者单位：New York University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：Investment of US firms responds asymmetrically to Tobin's Q: investment of established firms-intensive investment-reacts negatively to Q whereas investment of new firms-extensive investment-responds positively and elastically to Q. This asymmetry, we argue, reflects a difference between established and new firms in the cost of adopting new technologies. A fall in the compatibility of new capital with old capital raises measured Q and reduces the incentive of established firms to invest. New fi...
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作者：Fisman, Raymond; Schulz, Florian; Vig, Vikrant
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3-5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners' assets.
