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作者：McDevitt, Ryan C.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper considers when a firm's deliberately chosen name can signal meaningful information. The average plumbing firm whose name begins with A or a number receives five times more service complaints than other firms and also charges higher prices. Relatedly, plumbers with A names advertise more in the Yellow Pages and on Google, and doing so is positively correlated with receiving complaints. As the use of A names is more prevalent in larger markets, I reconcile these findings with a simple...
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作者：Mitra, Anirban; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：University of Oslo; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：We model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups. We show that if group incomes are low, increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it. We then apply the model to data on Hindu-Muslim violence in India. Our main result is that an increase in per capita Muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict. An increase in Hindu expenditures has a negative or no effect. These findings spe...
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作者：Helsley, Robert W.; Strange, William C.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Toronto
摘要：Cities are neither completely specialized nor completely diverse. However, prior research has focused almost entirely on the polar cases of complete specialization and complete diversity. This paper develops a model that can also generate the intermediate case of cities that feature the coagglomeration of some but not all industries, thus giving theoretical foundations to the analysis of business clusters. The analysis sharply challenges the conventional wisdom that the size and composition of...
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作者：Kessler, Anke S.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：The paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy-relevant information. Depending on the type of policy under consideration, communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible. This generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending, universalism, and uniformity. Building on th...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Plott, Charles R.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects' misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes ...
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作者：Rehavi, M. Marit; Starr, Sonja B.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Using rich data linking federal cases from arrest through to sentencing, we find that initial case and defendant characteristics, including arrest offense and criminal history, can explain most of the large raw racial disparity in federal sentences, but significant gaps remain. Across the distribution, blacks receive sentences that are almost 10 percent longer than those of comparable whites arrested for the same crimes. Most of this disparity can be explained by prosecutors' initial charging ...
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作者：Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of York - UK
摘要：This article proposes an efficient and incentive compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple complementary goods. The seller has reserve prices. The auctioneer announces a current price for every bundle of goods and a supply set of goods, every bidder responds with a set of goods demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts prices. We prove that even when bidders can exercise their market power strategically, this dynamic auction always induces them to bid truthfully, resulting in ...
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作者：Lucas, Robert E., Jr.; Moll, Benjamin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Princeton University
摘要：We analyze a model economy with many agents, each with a different productivity level. Agents divide their time between two activities: producing goods with the production-related knowledge they already have and interacting with others in search of new, productivity-increasing ideas. These choices jointly determine the economy''s current production level and its rate of learning and real growth. We construct the balanced growth path for this economy. We also study the allocation chosen by an i...
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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：Boston University; Keio University
摘要：We consider mechanism design in which message sets are restricted owing to communication costs, preventing full revelation of information. A principal contracts with multiple agents each supplying a one-dimensional good at a privately known cost. We characterize optimal mechanisms subject to incentive and communication constraints, without imposing arbitrary restrictions on the number of communication rounds. We show that mechanisms that centralize production decisions are strictly dominated b...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan; Rousseau, Peter L.
作者单位：New York University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：Investment of US firms responds asymmetrically to Tobin's Q: investment of established firms-intensive investment-reacts negatively to Q whereas investment of new firms-extensive investment-responds positively and elastically to Q. This asymmetry, we argue, reflects a difference between established and new firms in the cost of adopting new technologies. A fall in the compatibility of new capital with old capital raises measured Q and reduces the incentive of established firms to invest. New fi...
