The Private Returns to Public Office
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Fisman, Raymond; Schulz, Florian; Vig, Vikrant
署名单位：
Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; London Business School
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-3808
DOI：
10.1086/676334
发表日期：
2014
页码：
806-862
关键词：
摘要：
We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3-5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners' assets.
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