Communication in Federal Politics: Universalism, Policy Uniformity, and the Optimal Allocation of Fiscal Authority

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kessler, Anke S.
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/676404
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 766-805
• 关键词: distributive politics; information-transmission; LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION; public-goods; GOVERNMENT; decentralization; centralization; provision; increase; ECONOMY

摘要

The paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy-relevant information. Depending on the type of policy under consideration, communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible. This generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending, universalism, and uniformity. Building on these findings, I develop a theory of fiscal (de-)centralization, which revisits the work of Oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication. Empirical results from a cross section of US municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending.