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作者：Rajan, RG; Zingales, L
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers power to agents who make specific investments. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the firm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this literature, we identify a potentially superior mechanism, the regulation of access to critical resources. Access can be better than ownership because (i) the power agents get from access is more contingent on ...
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作者：Dixit, A; Londregan, J
作者单位：Princeton University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups, with disproportionately many swing voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to Director's Law, which says...
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作者：Shin, HH; Stulz, RM
作者单位：California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using segment information from Compustat, we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm's other segments, but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow. The investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single-segment firms. The sensitivity of a segment's investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunit...
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作者：Blundell, R; Preston, I
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper places the debate over using consumption or income in studies of inequality growth in a formal intertemporal setting. It highlights the importance of permanent and transitory income uncertainty in the evaluation of growth in consumption inequality. We derive conditions under which the growth of variances and covariances of income and consumption can be used to separately identify the growth in the variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. Household data from Britain for th...
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作者：Weitzman, ML
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper attempts to provide microfoundations for the knowledge production function in an idea-based growth model. Production of new ideas is made a function of newly reconfigured old ideas in the spirit of the way an agricultural research station develops improved plant varieties by cross-pollinating existing plant varieties. The model shows how knowledge can build upon itself in a combinatoric feedback process that may have significant implications for economic growth. The paper's main the...
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作者：Rouse, CE
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In 1990 Wisconsin began providing vouchers to a small number of low-income students to attend nonsectarian private schools. Controlling for individual fixed-effects, I compare the test scores of students selected to attend a participating private school with those of unsuccessful applicants and other students from the Milwaukee public schools. I find that students in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program had faster math score gains than, but similar reading score gains to, the comparison group...
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作者：de Meza, D; Lockwood, B
作者单位：University of Exeter
摘要：This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with; sometimes independent assets should be own...
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作者：Cutler, DM; Reber, SJ
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use data on health plan choices by employees of Harvard University to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection. Moving to a voucher-type system induced significant adverse selection, with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending. But increased competition reduced Harvard's premiums by 5 to 8 percent. The premium reductions came from insurer profits, so while Harvard was better off, the net effect for society was only the adverse selectio...
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作者：Che, JH; Qian, YY
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Stanford University
摘要：We develop a theory of the ownership of firms in an environment without secure property rights against state encroachment. Private ownership leads to excessive revenue hiding, and state ownership (i.e., national government ownership) fails to provide incentives for managers and local governments in a credible way. Because local government ownership integrates local government activities and business activities, local government may better serve the interests of the national government, and thu...
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作者：Romer, D
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
