Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive politics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dixit, A; Londregan, J
• 署名单位: Princeton University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/003355398555667
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 497-529
• 关键词: public production; optimal taxation

摘要

We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups, with disproportionately many swing voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to Director's Law, which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.