Insecure property rights and government ownership of firms
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Che, JH; Qian, YY
署名单位：
University of Notre Dame; Stanford University
刊物名称：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-5533
DOI：
10.1162/003355398555658
发表日期：
1998
页码：
467-496
关键词：
摘要：
We develop a theory of the ownership of firms in an environment without secure property rights against state encroachment. Private ownership leads to excessive revenue hiding, and state ownership (i.e., national government ownership) fails to provide incentives for managers and local governments in a credible way. Because local government ownership integrates local government activities and business activities, local government may better serve the interests of the national government, and thus local government ownership may credibly limit state predation, increase local public goods provision, and reduce costly revenue hiding. We use our theory to interpret the relative success of local government-owned firms during China's transition to a market economy.
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