Does asset ownership always motivate managers? Outside options and the property rights theory of the firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Meza, D; Lockwood, B
• 署名单位: University of Exeter
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/003355398555621
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 361-386
• 关键词: equilibrium

摘要

This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) property rights approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with; sometimes independent assets should be owned together; sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately.