-
作者：Gillen, Benjamin J.; Plott, Charles R.; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：A new information aggregation mechanism (IAM), developed via laboratory experimental methods, is implemented inside Intel Corporation in a long-running field test. The IAM, incorporating features of pari-mutuel betting, is uniquely designed to collect and quantize as probability distributions dispersed, subjectively held information. IAM participants' incentives support timely information revelation and the emergence of consensus beliefs over future outcomes. Empirical tests demonstrate the ro...
-
作者：Igami, Mitsuru
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper studies strategic industry dynamics of creative destruction in which firms and technologies experience turnover. Theories predict that cannibalization between existing and new products delays incumbents' innovation, whereas preemptive motives accelerate it. Incumbents' cost (dis)advantage relative to that of entrants would further reinforce these tendencies. To empirically assess these three forces, I estimate a dynamic oligopoly model using a unique panel data set of hard disk driv...
-
作者：Jaimovich, Nir; Rebelo, Sergio
作者单位：University of Southern California; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We propose a model consistent with two observations. First, the tax rates adopted by different countries are generally uncorrelated with their growth performance. Second, countries that drastically reduce private incentives to invest severely hurt their growth performance. In our model, the effects of taxation on growth are highly nonlinear. Low tax rates have a very small impact on long-run growth rates. But as tax rates rise, their negative impact on growth rises dramatically. The median vot...
-
作者：List, John
作者单位：University of Chicago
-
作者：Stokey, Nancy L.
作者单位：University of Chicago
-
作者：Mas, Alexandre
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage cuts were larger in cities with higher initial ...
-
作者：Cestau, Dario; Epple, Dennis; Sieg, Holger
作者单位：IE University; Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Minority and disadvantaged students are typically underrepresented in selective programs that use merit-based admission. Urban school districts may set different referral and admission thresholds based on income and race (affirmative action), and they may exploit differences in achievement relative to ability across race and income groups (profiling). We develop and estimate a model that provides a unified treatment of affirmative action and profiling. We find profiling by race and income and ...
-
作者：Adda, Jerome; Dustmann, Christian; Stevens, Katrien
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; University of Sydney
摘要：We estimate a dynamic life cycle model of labor supply, fertility, and savings, incorporating occupational choices, with specific wage paths and skill atrophy that vary over the career. This allows us to understand the trade-off between occupational choice and desired fertility, as well as sorting both into the labor market and across occupations. We quantify the life cycle career costs associated with children, how they decompose into loss of skills during interruptions, lost earnings opportu...
-
作者：Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan; Kircher, Philipp
作者单位：Princeton University; Harvard University; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); European University Institute; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We study the distributional consequences of trade in a world with two industries and two heterogeneous factors of production. Productivity in each production unit reflects the ability of the manager and the abilities of the workers, with complementarity between the two. We begin by examining the forces that govern the sorting of worker and manager types to industries and the matching of workers and managers within industries. We then consider how changes in relative output prices generated by ...
-
作者：Diamond, Douglas W.; Kashyap, Anil K.; Rajan, Raghuram G.
作者单位：University of Chicago
