A Pari-Mutuel-Like Mechanism for Information Aggregation: A Field Test inside Intel

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gillen, Benjamin J.; Plott, Charles R.; Shum, Matthew
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/692714
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1075-1099
• 关键词: favorite-longshot bias; MARKET-EFFICIENCY; SHOT BIAS; RISK; preferences

摘要

A new information aggregation mechanism (IAM), developed via laboratory experimental methods, is implemented inside Intel Corporation in a long-running field test. The IAM, incorporating features of pari-mutuel betting, is uniquely designed to collect and quantize as probability distributions dispersed, subjectively held information. IAM participants' incentives support timely information revelation and the emergence of consensus beliefs over future outcomes. Empirical tests demonstrate the robustness of experimental results and the IAM's practical usefulness in addressing real-world problems. The IAM's predictive distributions forecasting sales are very accurate, especially for short horizons and direct sales channels, often proving more accurate than Intel's internal forecast.