Collective Commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roessler, Christian; Shelegia, Sandro; Strulovici, Bruno
• 署名单位: California State University System; California State University East Bay; Pompeu Fabra University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/694294
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 347-380
• 关键词: interpersonal comparisons; Immiserizing growth; MAJORITY RULES; MODEL; lotteries

摘要

We consider collective decisions made by agents whose preferences and power depend on past events and decisions. Faced with an inefficient equilibrium and an opportunity to commit to a policy, can the agents reach an agreement on such a policy? We provide a consistency condition linking power structures in the dynamic setting and at the commitment stage. When the condition holds, commitment has no value: any agreement that may be reached at the outset coincides with the equilibrium without commitment. When the condition fails, as in the case of time-inconsistent preferences, commitment can improve outcomes. We discuss several applications.