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作者：Jeenas, Priit; Lagos, Ricardo
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We study the effects of monetary policy-induced changes in Tobin's q on corporate investment and capital structure. We develop a theory of the mechanism, provide empirical evidence, evaluate the ability of the quantitative theory to match the evidence, and quantify the relevance for monetary transmission to aggregate investment.
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作者：Argente, David; Lee, Munseob; Moreira, Sara
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California San Diego; Northwestern University
摘要：We document that sales of individual products decline steadily throughout most of the product life cycle. Products quickly become obsolete as they face competition from newer products sold by competing firms and the same firm. We build a dynamic model that highlights an innovation-obsolescence cycle, where firms need to introduce new products to grow; otherwise, their portfolios become obsolete as rivals introduce their own new products. By introducing new products, however, firms accelerate t...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Zhang, Mu
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We provide conditions under which a market mechanism can be used to allocate indivisible goods efficiently. We consider an economy with no transfers and show the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding pseudomarket with stochastic consumption. We demonstrate that constraints on minimum and maximum levels of individual consumption and aggregate constraints of the kind that are relevant in combinatorial allocation problems can be accommodated either by incorporating...
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作者：Eichenbaum, Martin; de Matos, Miguel Godinho; Lima, Francisco; Rebelo, Sergio; Trabandt, Mathias
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Universidade de Lisboa; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：This paper develops a quantitative theory of how people weigh the risks of infections against the benefits of engaging in social interactions that contribute to the spread of infectious diseases. Our framework takes into account the effects of public policies and private behavior on the spread of the disease. We evaluate the model using a novel micro panel dataset on consumption expenditures of young and older people across the first three waves of COVID-19 in Portugal. Our model highlights th...
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作者：Born, Benjamin; D'Ascanio, Francesco; Mueller, Gernot J.; Pfeifer, Johannes
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Accenture; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; Bundeswehr University Munich
摘要：In economies with fixed exchange rates, the adjustment to government-spending shocks is asymmetric. Expansionary shocks are absorbed by the real exchange rate, contractionary shocks by output. This result emerges in a small open-economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity and is supported by new empirical evidence based on panel data from different exchange-rate regimes. The exchange-rate regime, economic slack, inflation, and how spending is financed all matter for the fiscal transmissi...
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作者：Oberfield, Ezra; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban; Sarte, Pierre-Daniel; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：To decide the number, size, and location of its plants, a firm balances the benefit of delivering goods from multiple plants with the cost of setting up and managing these plants and the potential for cannibalization among them. Modeling the decisions of heterogeneous firms in an economy with a vast number of distinct locations involves a large combinatorial problem. Using insights from discrete geometry, we study a tractable limit case of this problem in which these forces operate at a local ...
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作者：Chan, Alex; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Harvard University; Stanford University
摘要：We conduct a lab experiment that shows that current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ-procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a two-player multiround game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only the highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some benef...
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作者：Davila, Eduardo; Graves, Daniel; Parlatore, Cecilia
作者单位：Yale University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the social value of closing price differentials in financial markets. We show that arbitrage gaps exactly correspond to the marginal social value of executing an arbitrage trade. Moreover, arbitrage gaps and price impact measures are sufficient to compute the total social value from closing an arbitrage gap, which may emerge for different reasons, including nonpecuniary benefits of holding particular assets. Theoretically, we show that, for a given arbitrage gap, the total s...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We extend Garicano's model of optimal organizations by allowing problems to be screened. We show that when screening is as costly as solving problems, optimal organizations are hierarchies as in Garicano's model, but when the cost of screening is small, workers screen all problems that they and the top managers cannot solve, those problems that they screen are sent directly to those who can solve them, and those problems that they neither solve nor screen are passed to the top managers. For in...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Cornell University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We characterize optimal honest and obedient (HO) mechanisms for the classic collective action problem with private information, where group success requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. For large n, a simple HO mechanism, the volunteer-based organization, is approximately optimal. Success is achieved in the limit with probability one or zero depending on the rate at which the required fraction declines with n. For finite n, optimal HO mechanisms provide substantial gai...
