Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market-Design Lab Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chan, Alex; Roth, Alvin E.
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/730546
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3827-3866
• 关键词: CENTER PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS; ACTION BIAS; kidney; Donation; priority; care; association; Oversight; promise; volume

摘要

We conduct a lab experiment that shows that current rules regulating transplant centers (TCs) and organ-procurement organizations (OPOs) create perverse incentives that inefficiently reduce both organ recovery and beneficial transplantations. We model the decision environment with a two-player multiround game between an OPO and a TC. In the condition that simulates current rules, OPOs recover only the highest-quality kidneys and forgo valuable recovery opportunities, and TCs decline some beneficial transplants. Alternative regulations that reward TCs and OPOs together for health outcomes in their entire patient pool lead to behaviors that increase organ recovery and appropriate transplants.