Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Goods in Pseudomarkets with Constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang; Zhang, Mu
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/730561
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3708-3736
• 关键词: Gross substitutes; competitive-equilibrium; Walrasian equilibrium; assignment; individuals; preferences

摘要

We provide conditions under which a market mechanism can be used to allocate indivisible goods efficiently. We consider an economy with no transfers and show the existence and efficiency of Walrasian equilibria in the corresponding pseudomarket with stochastic consumption. We demonstrate that constraints on minimum and maximum levels of individual consumption and aggregate constraints of the kind that are relevant in combinatorial allocation problems can be accommodated either by incorporating these constraints into individual preferences or by specifying a suitable production technology.