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作者：Agostinelli, Francesco; Wiswall, Matthew
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：In this paper, we study the process of children's skill formation using a dynamic latent factor model to identify key features of the skill production function. We develop and estimate a joint dynamic process for latent investment and skill development, incorporating both static and dynamic complementarities between parental investments and children's skills in the technology of skill formation. Our analysis of US data reveals that early childhood investments (age 5-6) are highly effective for...
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作者：Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas; Lewis, Matthew S.; Marx, Leslie M.; Wu, Xiaosong
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Liverpool; Clemson University; Duke University
摘要：Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, w...
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作者：Elliott, Jonathan T.; Houngbonon, Georges V.; Ivaldi, Marc; Scott, Paul T.
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructure among mobile network operators. Although consolidation increases market power, it can lead to more efficient data transmission due to economies of scale, which we derive from physical principles. After estimating our model with French consumer and infrastructure data, equilibrium simulations reveal that while prices decrease with the number of firms, so do download speeds. Our framework also allows us to quantify the impact of spec...
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作者：Howell, Sabrina T.; Rathje, Jason; Van Reenen, John; Wong, Jun
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：For governments procuring innovation, one choice is whether to specify desired products (a conventional approach) or allow firms to suggest ideas (an open approach). Using a US Air Force R&D grant program where open and conventional competitions were held simultaneously, we find that open awards increase both commercial innovation and technology adoption by the military. In contrast, conventional awards have no positive effects on new technology but do create more program lock-in. We present e...
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作者：Basak, Deepal; Zhou, Zhen
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Tsinghua University
摘要：We study optimal adversarial information design in a dynamic regime change game. Agents decide when to attack, if at all. We assume (1) delay incurs a continuous cost and (2) agents doubt the correctness of their actions. The game may end in a disaster due to weak fundamentals or panic-agents attacking despite sound fundamentals. We propose a timely disaster alert that promptly warns about impending disasters, making waiting for and following the alert the unique rationalizable strategy, there...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando
作者单位：University of Chicago
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作者：Kong, Yunmi; Silveira, Bernardo S.; Tang, Xun
作者单位：Rice University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We develop and estimate a structural model of arbitration, accounting for asymmetric risk attitudes and learning. Using data on public sector wage disputes in New Jersey, we compare the efficiency of two popular arbitration formats: final offer and conventional. We find that although conventional arbitration hinders the transmission of case-relevant information from the disputants to the arbitrator, this format outperforms final offer arbitration by affording discretion to select awards. We al...
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作者：Slattery, Cailin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：State and local governments in the United States compete to attract firms by offering discretionary subsidies. I use a private value English auction to model the subsidy bidding process and quantify the welfare effects of competition. The allocation of rents between states and firms depends on the heterogeneity in states' valuations for firms and the substitutability of locations. I find that competition increases welfare by less than 5% over a subsidy ban, and states compete away the surplus,...
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作者：Mak, Eric; Siow, Aloysius
作者单位：University of Jinan; University of Toronto
摘要：We combine classic occupational choice (Roy model) and frictionless matching (following Sattinger) to explain earnings by occupation and firm in a way that is consistent with double assignment. In our model, within-firm inequality is globally nonzero whenever there is asymmetry in the revenue function or the occupational skill distribution across occupations. Occupational earnings overlap each other, and, unlike in the Roy model, the distributions of potential earnings are endogenous. In line ...
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作者：Deserranno, Erika; Caria, A. Stefano; Kastrau, Philipp; Leon-Ciliotta, Gianmarco
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Warwick; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：Does the allocation of incentives across the hierarchy of an organization matter for its performance? In an experiment with a large public health organization, we find that health care provision is highly affected by how incentives are allocated between frontline workers and their supervisors. Sharing incentives equally between these two layers raises health visits by 61% compared with unilateral allocations and uniquely improves health service provision and health outcomes. We provide reduced...
