Panics and Early Warnings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Basak, Deepal; Zhou, Zhen
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/734875
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 2089-2138
• 关键词: DYNAMIC GLOBAL GAMES; Bayesian persuasion; COORDINATION; stress; delay

摘要

We study optimal adversarial information design in a dynamic regime change game. Agents decide when to attack, if at all. We assume (1) delay incurs a continuous cost and (2) agents doubt the correctness of their actions. The game may end in a disaster due to weak fundamentals or panic-agents attacking despite sound fundamentals. We propose a timely disaster alert that promptly warns about impending disasters, making waiting for and following the alert the unique rationalizable strategy, thereby eliminating panic. We relate this optimal policy to early-warning systems such as bank stress tests and debt sustainability analysis.