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作者：Anderson, Axel; Rosen, Jeremy; Rust, John; Wong, Kin-Ping
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：Do the world's best tennis pros play Nash equilibrium mixed strategies? We answer this question using data on serve-direction choices (to the receiver's left, right, or body) from the Match Charting Project. Using a new approach, we test and reject a key implication of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: that the probability of winning the service game is identical for all possible serve strategies. We calculate best-response serve strategies by dynamic programming (DP) and show that for most e...
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作者：Cuciniello, Vincenzo; Michelacci, Claudio; Paciello, Luigi
作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We study business creation subsidies in a general equilibrium model where firms are financially constrained upon entry and borrow competitively by issuing long-term debt. If paid out before business formation (ex ante), the subsidy reduces start-ups' debt and bankruptcy rates; if paid out as a refund of expenditures (ex post), it reduces equity rather than debt, raising bankruptcies among both new and existing firms. In a model calibrated to Southern Italy, the optimal subsidy is paid entirely...
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作者：Davila, Eduardo; Schaab, Andreas
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper introduces a decomposition of welfare assessments for general dynamic stochastic economies with heterogeneous individuals. The decomposition is based on constructing individual, dynamic, and stochastic weights that characterize how welfarist planners make trade-offs across individuals, dates, and histories. Guided by the compensation principle, it initially decomposes a welfare assessment into an efficiency and a redistribution component, while the efficiency component is further de...
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作者：Fan, Ying; Yang, Chenyu
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This paper presents a method for estimating discrete games based on bounds of conditional choice probabilities. The bounds are probabilities that an action is dominant and that it is not dominated. Because the bounds are easy to compute, our method is scalable to models with many firms and discrete decisions. We apply the method to study the effects of a hypothetical merger on firm entry and product variety in local retail craft beer markets in California. We find that the merger induces firm ...
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作者：Krishnamurthy, Arvind; Li, Wenhao
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Southern California
摘要：We develop a model of financial crises with both a financial amplification mechanism, via frictional intermediation, and a role for sentiment, via time-varying beliefs about an illiquidity state. The model accounts for the entire crisis cycle, matching data on the frothy precrisis behavior of asset markets and credit; the sharp transition to a crisis where asset values fall, disintermediation occurs, and output falls; and the slow postcrisis recovery in output. Both the intermediation and the ...
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作者：Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique; Gil, Ricard; Uriz-Uharte, Guillermo
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We empirically investigate how the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) changes when gaining access to market information. To do so, we evaluate the impact of an information program diffused by a bank among its SME customers. Adopting firms gained access to reports with rich information about their own clientele and that of nearby establishments. While we find that adoption is associated with a 4.5% revenue increase, our instrumental variable results indicate that adoption ...
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作者：Mekonnen, Teddy; Murra-Anton, Zeky; Pakzad-Hurson, Bobak
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can acquire information from a profit-maximizing principal with limited commitment power. The principal can charge higher prices for more informative signals, but high future prices discourage continued search, thereby reducing the principal's profits. A unique stationary equilibrium outcome exists: the principal (i) sells the agent only partial information, (ii) induces the socially efficient stopping rule, ...
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作者：Johnson, Matthew S.; Lavetti, Kurt; Lipsitz, Michael
作者单位：Duke University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze how the legal enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) affects labor markets. Using newly constructed panel data, we find that higher NCA enforceability diminishes workers' earnings and job mobility, with larger effects among workers most likely to sign NCAs. These effects are far-reaching: increasing enforceability imposes externalities on workers across state borders, suggesting broad effects on labor market dynamism. We show that enforceability affects wages by reducing out...
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作者：Hemous, David; Olsen, Morten; Zanella, Carlo; Dechezlepretre, Antoine
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Copenhagen; Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD)
摘要：Do higher wages induce more automation innovation? We identify automation patents in machinery. We show that a higher automation intensity predicts a decline in routine tasks across US sectors. Then, we estimate how innovating firms respond to changes in their downstream firms' low- and high-skill wages. We compute these wages by combining macroeconomic data on 41 countries with innovating firms' global market exposure. Higher low-skill wages increase automation innovation (but not other machi...
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作者：De Nardi, Mariacristina; French, Eric; Jones, John Bailey; Mcgee, Rory
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We estimate a model of savings for retired couples and singles who face longevity and medical expense risks and in which couples can leave bequests both when the first spouse dies and when the last spouse dies. We show that saving motives vary by marital status, permanent income, and age. We find that most households save more for medical expenses than for bequests but that richer households and couples, who hold most of the wealth, save more for bequests. As a result, bequest motives are a ke...
