Asymmetric Information Sharing in Oligopoly: A Natural Experiment in Retail Gasoline

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas; Lewis, Matthew S.; Marx, Leslie M.; Wu, Xiaosong
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; University of Liverpool; Clemson University; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/734872
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 2031-2088
• 关键词: PRICE CYCLES; strategic ignorance; collusion; COMMUNICATION; COORDINATION; INVESTMENT; leadership; MARKETS; cartel

摘要

Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, we find substantial profit-enhancing effects of asymmetric information sharing. These results provide a cautionary tale for antitrust agencies regarding the potential unintended consequences of limiting price information sharing among firms.