Subsidizing Business Entry in Competitive Credit Markets

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Cuciniello, Vincenzo; Michelacci, Claudio; Paciello, Luigi
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/737231
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: investment; entrepreneurship; constraints; policies; WEALTH; MODEL

摘要

We study business creation subsidies in a general equilibrium model where firms are financially constrained upon entry and borrow competitively by issuing long-term debt. If paid out before business formation (ex ante), the subsidy reduces start-ups' debt and bankruptcy rates; if paid out as a refund of expenditures (ex post), it reduces equity rather than debt, raising bankruptcies among both new and existing firms. In a model calibrated to Southern Italy, the optimal subsidy is paid entirely ex ante, raising welfare by 2% of consumption. If paid ex post, the same subsidy would result in welfare losses.